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Burgess (1993) finds that job finding rates for the unemployed do not move 
proportionately to changes in the overall hiring rate. Burgess hints at employed job 
seekers that start looking in tight conditions and crowd out the unemployed. But he 
leaves the search behaviour of firms unaddressed. Russo et al. (2000) and Russo et 
al. (2001), however, shows that firms switch their preferred recruitment channel in 
changing labour market conditions. We introduce recruitment channels in a search 
model and find an additional mechanism through which the unemployed obtain less 
than their ‘fair share’ of the job offers. We then test our model’s predictions using 
panel data from the Netherlands and find support for this hypothesis 
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1 Introduction 
Unemployment is back on the agenda. As many countries suffer the consequences of the 
global economic recession, unemployment is on the rise and is projected to remain high 
for the years to come. For the Netherlands a doubling of the unemployment rate between 
2008 and 2010 is deemed likely.
4 And for many countries similar or worse projections 
have been made (OECD (2009)). As these job losses are hard or impossible to prevent, 
governments  should  now  prepare  to  ensure  that  the  recovery  also  benefits  the 
unemployed.  This  is  not  self-evident  as  past  recoveries  have  shown  (OECD  (2009)). 
Economic recovery does not automatically translate into job growth and job growth does 
not automatically translate into jobs for the unemployed. Burgess (1993) for example 
showed that in the 80s a one percent increase in the hiring rate on the British labour 
market only led to a 0.31 percent increase in the outflow rate for the unemployed. And 
CWI (2003) found similar results for the Netherlands in the late 90s. Economic recovery, 
even if it generates new jobs, does not mean it generates jobs for those who need them 
most.
5 To prevent these low outflow rates from recurring in the recovery one needs to 
understand what mechanism explains this counterintuitive finding.  
Our paper aims to contribute to this understanding and is closely related to the literature 
on  search  models  of  the  labour  market  in  general  and  on-the-job  search  and  firm 
recruitment  behaviour  in  particular.  To  illustrate  the  basic  mechanism  we  intend  to 
highlight, we first build a matching model of the labour market in which on-the-job and 
unemployed  job  seekers  compete  for  jobs  offered  by  firms  in  an  open  (e.g. 
advertisements) and closed (e,g. the labour exchange office) recruitment channel. In the 
model the agent’s decision on how hard to search in what channel depends on the actions 
of the other agents and the general economic conditions. We then test the predictions in a 
dataset for the  Netherlands and find support for the  mechanism we hypothesise. The 
analysis leads to some highly relevant policy implications. Employment prospects of the 
(long-term) unemployed hardly improve under improving labour market conditions and 
countercyclical  labour  market  policies  therefore  need  not  be  optimal.  In  a  tightening 
labour market policy makers should be aware that the (long-term) unemployed may be 
tempted to switch out of the advertisement channel and thereby reduce their probability 
of finding a job. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the  key 
references and positions the paper in the literature to which it hopes to contribute. Section 
3  outlines  our  model  and  discusses  the  decisions  of  the  firm,  the  employed  and  the 
unemployed job seekers and analyses the equilibrium to which their interaction leads. 
Section 4 describes the data and tests our hypotheses. Section 5 then discusses policy 
implication and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Search and recruitment behaviour 
                                                            
4  CPB (2009) projects the unemployment rate to go from 3.9% in 2008 to 9.5% in 2010. 
5 In addition, Boeheim and Taylor show that if they are successful in finding a job it typically last shorter 
implying the quality of the match is lower.   4 
The empirical literature on job search has confirmed the Burgess (1993) finding that the 
correlation between the hiring rate and the outflow rate out of unemployment is (much) 
less than one has provided several competing explanations. Most of these papers contend 
or hypothesise that there is a mismatch between in particular the unemployed job seekers 
and the jobs offered. The explanations, however, differ widely in the type of mismatch 
they explore. 
A  first part  of  this  literature  focuses  on  the poor  competitive  position of (long-term) 
unemployed job seekers, which makes them unlikely candidates to fill vacancies when 
invited.  There  are  two  main  reasons:  First,  skill  decay  following  persistent  spells  of 
unemployment lowers the likelihood of being selected for a job – see Bean (1994) or 
Blanchard  and  Diamond  (1994).  And  second,  employed  job  seekers  provide  tough 
competition  for  unemployed job  seekers  especially  in  tight labour  market  conditions, 
when on-the-job search typically takes place – see Barlevy (2002) and Krause and Lubik 
(2006). We might refer to this type as skill-mismatch as the skills of the unemployed 
make them less or unsuitable for the job on offer. There is some evidence to support this 
hypothesis.  Burgess  (1993)  hints  at  the  importance  of  on-the-job  search.  In  such 
conditions the job offer rate is high and consequently the expected revenues from job 
search in terms of finding a new – better paying – job are higher. Therefore, Burgess 
argues  that,  although  tightness  leads  to  more  job  openings  and  falling  aggregate 
unemployment  rates,  it  also  triggers  on-the-job  search  and  subsequently  on-the-job 
seekers partially crowd out unemployed job seekers.
6 Other types of mismatch, however, 
may produce similar outcomes. 
For example, another strand of the literature focuses on the lower likelihood that (long-
term)  unemployed  job  seekers  even  meet  the  employers  who  post  vacancies.  First, 
employers may neglect unemployed job seekers in application procedures outright, i.e. 
stigmatise  the  (long-term)  unemployed  –  see  Riach  and  Rich  (2002),  Eriksson  and 
Lagerstrom (2006) and Oberholzer-Gee (2008). We could refer to this as perceived skill 
mismatch and it is a source of mismatch that originates in the behaviour of firms. Second, 
continuous application rejections may demoralise the unemployed job seeker to continue 
searching for a job, which reduces his job find chances – see Layard et al. (1991) and 
Lindsay et al. (2003). That may give rise to search intensity mismatch that originates in 
job  seeker  behaviour.  Then  institutional  settings  may  adversely  affect  the  search 
effectiveness of the unemployed – see Roed  and Zhang (2003),  Van den Berg et al. 
(2004),  Abbring  et  al.  (2005)  and  Bloemen  (2007),  causing  search  effectiveness 
mismatch,  which  does  not  originate  in  behaviour  like  spatial  mismatch.  That  is, 
unemployed job seekers may simply be spatially separated from the job opportunities 
through agglomeration effects – see Wheeler (2001), Coulson et al. (2003) and Holzer 
and  Stoll  (2003).  All  these  sources  of  mismatch  have  in  common  that  there  is  no 
objective worker or job characteristics that would prevent a successful match. But these 
sources of mismatch also either rely on the psychology of one of the searching parties or 
                                                            
6 Our paper is – like Burgess (1993) – on (unemployment) flows; not on stocks. One could argue that 
whenever an employed job seekers accepts a job, he also ‘produces’ a vacancy (i.e. the job he leaves), 
which  would  leave  the  aggregate  employment  outcome  unchanged.  However,  as  Burgess  already 
demonstrates,  employed  job  seekers  lengthen  the  jobless  spell  of  the  unemployed.  Since  we  will  be 
discussing timing issues of labour market policy, analysing the job search is relevant for our purpose.   5 
on  the  exogenously  given  geographical  or  institutional  circumstances  the  parties  find 
themselves in.  
In this paper we offer an additional source of mismatch that emerges when (unemployed) 
job seekers and employers (inter)act rationally in their search behaviour and that explains 
Burgess’  (1993)  finding.  To  do  so  we  focus  on  the  recruitment  channel  choice  of 
employers, which we contend is sensitive to the business cycle because of the cyclicality 
of on-the-job search. Consequently, the search channel choice of unemployed job seekers 
becomes conditional on the employer’s recruitment channel choice, which implies it is 
business cycle sensitive as well. Subsequently, the unemployed job seeker faces a trade-
off. Either mimic the recruitment channel choice behaviour of employers, which – in 
tight conditions – implies compete with employed job seekers, or alternatively, not mimic 
employer search channel behaviour, which will lead to search channel mismatch, i.e. a 
reduced likelihood of meeting recruiting employers in tight conditions.  
There is some important evidence on the choice of search and recruitment channels that 
supports  our  general  assumptions  and  claims.  The  employer  search  literature,  for 
example,  shows  that  such  recruitment  channel  switches  over  the  business  cycle  are 
important. Russo et al. (2000, 2001) show that firms switch from recruitment through the 
labour exchange office to using advertisements as the prime recruitment channel as the 
labour  market  tightens.  Since  advertisements  generate  more  applicants,  such  a 
recruitment channel switch enables the recruiting employer to smooth the arrival rate of 
applicants over the business cycle. CWI (2003) provides more detailed information for 
the Dutch case. They show that between 1991 and 2003, a period covering about one full 
economic cycle, the use of advertisements is indeed negatively correlated with the use of 
the labour exchange office and moves pro cyclically.
7 
Moreover, Russo et al. (2000, 2001) show that advertisements yield a higher average 
quality pool of applicants than recruiting via the labour exchange office. CWI (2003) also 
confirms this finding. It is shown that in loosening labour market conditions as in 2002-
2003 the effectiveness, which is defined as the number of hires through a channel over 
the number of vacancies posted in that channel, falls for advertisements (49% to 36%) 
and increases (8% to 11%) for the labour exchange office. 
Overall  CWI  (2003)  concludes  that  the  advertisement  is  the  most  frequently  used 
recruitment channel in tight conditions; in loose conditions the labour exchange office 
and in particular informal contact become more important. This conclusion sets the stage 
for the unemployed job seeker who will face a search channel choice dilemma when the 
labour  market  tightens.  Before  conducting  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  way  the 
unemployed job seeker negotiates this dilemma, we first derive the main hypotheses in a 
formal model that endogenises the search and recruitment activity of job seekers and 
firms when more than one channel is available.
8 
                                                            
7  In  addition  they  show  a  rising  importance  of  the  Internet  and  informal  channels  such  as  open  job 
applications. 
8 In this paper we restrict the analysis to two recruitment (or search) channels: advertisements and the 
labour exchange office. Of course there are more recruitment strategies. Employed job seekers also use 
informal channels – see Lindeboom et al. (1994). However, extending the number of recruitment channels 
complicates the analysis, without enriching it. Crucial for our argumentation is that employed job seekers 
do not use the labour exchange office as a recruitment channel but different channels like advertisements.   6 
We will show that in our model employers shift search effort towards the more expensive 
advertisement channel when the labour market tightens, not (only) to keep up application 
rates – as Russo et al. (2001) suggest – but because the relative probability of filling a 
vacancy  through  that channel  increases.  This relative  probability  essentially  increases 
because  employed  job  seekers  intensify  their  job  search  through  the  advertisement 
channel in tight conditions. Instead we use the fact that employed job seekers primarily 
search via advertisements to find a new job – see Russo et al. (2000, 2001) and CWI 
(2003), to explain why firms may switch to and unemployed job seekers may switch 
away from the advertisement channel in tightening conditions.  
Those  unemployed  job  seekers  that  do  shift  towards  the  advertised  vacancies  face 
competition of employed job seekers, which reduces the probability of finding a job, even 
if they are equally qualified and employers do not discriminate. Continuing search via the 
labour exchange office is no lucrative alternative as (effective) vacancy supply through 
that channel declines. In the end, both effects turn out to be mutually reinforcing and 
policies to aid the (long-term) unemployed should therefore be pro-cyclical. 
3 Modelling search and recruitment behaviour 
Standard  matching  models operate  a  linearly  homogeneous  matching  function,  which 
contains two arguments: the number of job seekers and the number of vacancies. The 
matching rate is positive in both arguments. We follow Pissarides (2000) in introducing 
search effectiveness on both sides of the labour market. Increasing search effort of the 
firm,  s
f,  improves  the  likelihood  to  fill  the  vacancy;  increasing  search  effort  of 
unemployed  job  seekers,  s
u,  or  employed  job  seekers,  s
e,  increases  the  likelihood  of 
finding a job. Effectively, introducing search effort translates the number of vacancies 
and job seekers into efficiency units. 
We also assume that firms and job seekers set their respective search effort to maximise 
the value of their current state in the labour market and that firms and the unemployed 
and employed job seekers are identical, which enables us to derive aggregate results for 
unemployment and vacancy rates that in turn affect the decisions made at the micro-level. 
By  assuming  symmetry  across  job  seekers  and  firms  the  aggregate  average  search 
intensity is equal to the search effort the individual agent would choose given the search 
behaviour of other firms and job seekers in the market. Before we turn to the individual 
decision  problems,  however,  it  is  useful  to  introduce  some  notation  and  the  basic 
framework. 
In our model the employer can post a vacancy in two distinct recruitment channels. In 
general  there  are  obviously  more  –  see  e.g.  Rees  (1966),  but  for  simplicity  we  here 
distinguish  a  channel  that  is  relatively  cheap  and  only  accessible  to  the  unemployed 
(labour exchange offices) and a relatively expensive one in which both employed and 
unemployed job seekers may apply (advertisements). The model can be generalised in 
this  direction  but  that would  add  little  explanation  and  a lot of  complication.  As  we 
distinguish two channels for recruitment and have barred employed job seekers from one 
of them, we have two matching functions that are assumed to be given by: 
) , ) 1 ( (
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              (1)   7 
Where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the labour exchange office and advertisement channels 
respectively. The matching function, as usual is positive and concave in both arguments. 
Aggregate search effort of unemployed job seekers through the labour exchange office, 
s
u
1, through advertisements, s
u
2 and of employed job seekers through advertisements, s
e
2, 
augments the effectiveness of job seekers in producing matches. Similarly search effort 
by firms, s
f
1,2 augments the effectiveness of vacancies. The overall unemployment, u, and 
channel specific vacancy rates, v1 and v2 respectively, will all be endogenised below. 
Equation 1 defines the number of matches per unit of time but we have suppressed time 
subscripts to save on notation. Time, however, will be treated discretely in what follows. 
The linear homogeneity assumption of the matching function enables us to eliminate L – 
the labour force – and write both matching rates in terms of effective unemployment and 
vacancy rates only. 
By assuming symmetry we know that all k firms must search at the average aggregate 






1,2  for 
all j i ≠ k j i ∈ , . By furthermore randomly assigning matches over firms we obtain the 
result that the probability a vacancy is filled, ϕ, through recruitment channels 1 and 2 
respectively is equal for all firms and given by the number of matches over the number of 
vacancies posted in that channel which reduces to a function of aggregate search efforts 
and channel specific market tightness (v1,2 / u), θ1,2: 
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  (2) 
where θ1,2 is tightness in channels 1 and 2 respectively. These probabilities are positive in 
total number and average search effort of the job seekers. Obviously these probabilities 
are also positive in the search effort of firms and negative in the number of vacancies.
9 
Assuming firms are identical and set the same (average) search effort in both channels, 
implies that the probabilities above are the probability that a firm will fill its vacancy in a 
given  discrete  period  of  time  in  channel  1  and  2.  The  probability  that  an  individual 
unemployed job seeker finds a job in that discrete period of time, ψ
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Note that these job finding probabilities ceteris paribus depend positively on individual 




i2, but negatively on average search effort in 
channels  1  and  2,  s
u
1  and  us
u
2  +  (1  −  u)s
e
2,  respectively.
10  Also  note  that  aggregate 
unemployment and vacancy rates affect the marginal effect of effort on-the-job finding 
                                                            
9 Although in the disaggregated case the firm would face a probability that is positive in his own search 
effort and negative in the average search effort of other firms. As we are only interested in the choice of 
channel and not the intensity of search we simply abstract from that. 
10 We also assume symmetry within groups of job seekers and across them in all but one aspect, the options 
for search. Therefore we now have to address the decentralised decision process as we have asymmetry 
within the group of job seekers and their behaviour depends on that of the other group. The third factor on 
the right hand side of equation 3 corrects for the possibility that a job seeker simultaneously finds a job in 
channel 1 and 2. Since 0 < ϕ1, ϕ2 < 1, the suggested qualitative effects of the various search efforts do not 
change.   8 
probability. This will later on drive the allocation of job search effort over both channels. 
Likewise, the employed job seeker’s job finding probability, ψe, depends positively on 
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With all unemployed job seekers assumed identical, average and individual effort levels 
are equal within that group. To close this model we assume an exogenous lay-off rate, λ, 
such  that  in every period  λ(1  −  u)L  people  become  unemployed.  In  equilibrium  this 
inflow must equal the per period outflow from unemployment, which equals the number 
of unemployed in equilibrium, U = uL times the transition probability of the average 







1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
ϕ ϕ θ ϕ ϕ θ ψ
u s u s
v s










+ =         (5) 
Equivalently, the matching rate must equal the sum of job finding rate on-the-job plus the 
outflow  rate  of  unemployment.
11  We  now  turn  to  the  decision  problems  faced  by 
individual employers, employed job seekers and the unemployed. 
3.1 Decision process of employers 
It is common in search and matching models to regard the posting of a vacancy as the 
purchase of an asset, the option to fill it and start producing. In equilibrium the return on 
that vacancy must therefore equal the return on alternative assets, r.
12 Since all firms are 
assumed to be equal, they will all choose the average level of effort and this yields the 
standard Bellman-equation:
13  
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ϕ             (6) 
where J is the value of a match for the employers, ϕc is the (flow) probability a vacancy 
is filled in the next period, cc are the flow costs to keep a vacancy open in channel c per 
unit of time and search intensity, s
f
c, which is chosen by firms to maximise the value of 
vacancies in channel c. Solving (6) for Vc and differentiating with respect to s
f
c yields the 
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11 Obviously when all rates are defined relative to the total labour force. 
12 Here we assume risk neutrality or equivalently treat r as the return on equally risky assets. 
13 Signs above arguments indicate the sign of the (partial) derivative. In fact, as firms do not take into 
consideration the impact their search has on the other firms’ probability of success, the average search 
intensity in channel c should enter with a negative sign. Firms will over invest in search and impose an 
externality on each other. However, this is not relevant for the purpose of this paper and does not change its 
key results.   9 
By the properties of ϕc (0 < ϕc < 1, ϕ’c > 0, ϕ”c < 0) it can be verified that optimal search 
effort in channel c is negative in flow costs and positive in the interest rate and value of a 
job. Figure 1 below shows the left and right hand side of equation 7 as a function of 
search effort.
14 Increasing for example the flow costs of posting a vacancy at the labour 
exchange office would shift the left hand side down, while not affecting the right hand 
side, thus reducing the optimal search effort of firms in that channel. 
 
 
Figure 1: Optimal search effort of the firm 
 
 
In equilibrium all profit opportunities from new jobs are exploited, which drives the rents 
from a vacancy down to zero. Hence, vacancies are posted until Vjc = 0 holds at the 
individual and aggregate level for both channels. The assumption that the recruitment 
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This assumption implies that recruitment is pure friction and different channels cannot be 
used to attract higher quality applicants, a feature that is perhaps not realistic but allows 
us  to  focus  on  the  mechanism  we  intend  to  uncover  here.
15  Equation  8  implicitly 
determines the number of vacancies in both channels as a function of costs and the value 
of a job. By the fact that the marginal probability of filling a vacancy is, ceteris paribus, 
decreasing in the vacancy rate in both channels, vacancies are posted until the condition 
in (8) is met. Higher costs reduce the optimal number of vacancies; higher job value 
increases the optimal vacancy rate. 
Now consider the value of a job to the firm. A job or match can also be regarded as an 
asset.  As  long  as  the  match  exists,  the  flow  of  surplus  equals,  after  appropriately 
normalising units, the unit price minus the unit wage costs. That flow of surplus is lost 
when there is a lay-off or when the worker finds a better job and quits, at which time the 
entire surplus is lost. We obtain the Bellman-equation: 
J w p rJ
e) ( ψ λ + − − =                 (9) 




ψ λ + +
−
=                   (10) 
                                                            
14 In this graph the right hand side is drawn as a convex curve. In fact it can be both convex and concave. 
All  that  the  assumptions imply  is  that it is  upward sloping  over  its  entire  domain  and  has  a  positive 
intercept. We assume r/ϕ’c < Jr/cc. 
15 Note that Burgess (1993) did suggest that employed job seekers would be of higher quality to the firm. 
Although this is part of the explanation for the less than proportional effect of hiring on outflow rates, it is 
not part of the model in this paper.   10 
Now substituting for the value of a job into (8) yields a first order condition for posting 
vacancies in terms of aggregate variables only. Substituting into equation 7 yields the 
first order condition for setting optimal search effort in both channels, also in terms of 














































ϕ ϕ ψ λ
      (11) 
which implicitly and endogenously determines the number of vacancies posted in either 
channel, given the unit price, unit wage costs, the exogenous separation rate, the flow 
costs of posting a vacancy and the various (marginal) probabilities that in turn depend on 
the behaviour of unemployed and employed job seekers and aggregate labour market 
tightness. 
It  can  be  verified  that  effort  and  vacancies  in  one  channel  depend  positively  on  the 
aggregate marginal probability that a vacancy is filled and negatively on the flow costs of 
keeping  vacancies  open  in  that  channel.  This  implies  that  tightness  in  one  particular 
channel will cause employers to shift their attention towards the other channel. However, 
Russo  et  al.  (2000)  demonstrate  that  employers  will  switch  to  channel  2,  the 
advertisements, when labour markets as a whole tighten. Ceteris paribus the increase in 
overall  tightness  would  affect  the  allocation  of  effort  over  the  two  channels  as  the 
probability  of  filling  a  vacancy  drops  relatively  faster  in  channel  1.  This  is  the  case 
because at decreasing unemployment rates the number of employed job seekers increases, 
increasing the relative probability in channel 2. However, it is shown below that the 
results are strengthened by also taking into account the response of job seekers. 
3.2 Decision process of unemployed job seekers 
Unemployed job seekers must allocate their time between searching in either of the two 
search channels available to them or not searching at all, in which case we assume they 
enjoy their outside option z. Their unemployed status can thus be regarded as an asset that 
yields the outside option and the expected value of finding a job. Again we can write the 
Bellman equation: 
) ( U W z rU
u − + = ψ                   (12) 
where W is the value of a job to the worker, U the value of being unemployed and ψ
u the 
flow  probability  that  an  unemployed  worker  finds  a  job.  The  individual  outflow 
probability of the unemployed, given in (3) is a function of individual search effort in 
both channels. Hence unemployed job seekers set search effort to maximise the value of 
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    (14) 
which, by the strict positivity of ψ




2 are chosen such that 
the partial derivatives or marginal probabilities are equal in both search channels. 




i2 are obviously positive. By 
the  assumption  of  diminishing  returns  to  effort  and  the  fact  that  probabilities  cannot 
exceed 1 the second order partial derivative must be negative. In addition the (marginal) 
probability of finding a job in channel 1 is hardly affected by search effort s
e
2 (only 
through the cross-term in equation 3), whereas that in channel 2 is negatively affected by 
it (see equation 3). The marginal probability in both channels is positively affected by the 
number  of  vacancies  posted  in  that  channel  and  negatively  by  the  total  number  of 
unemployed. However, as only the unemployed search through channel 1, the effect of 
the same increase in unemployment is larger in that channel and job seekers will switch 
towards advertisements (or withdraw altogether enjoying z, the outside option). 
Equation 14 thus reveals that the relative search effort of individual unemployed workers 
in channels 1 and 2 depends only on their marginal outflow probabilities. Assuming all 
unemployed job seekers are identical one can thus derive that optimal average search 
effort in channel 2 is positive in vacancy rates and firm search effort and negative in the 
employed job seekers search effort and the unemployment rate. In channel 1 the effects 
are the same except that higher search effort by employed job seekers increases optimal 
search effort in that channel. Note that the conditions in equation 13 make the level of 
overall effort a positive function of the difference between the flow return on having a 
job, rW and the outside option z, as well as a negative function of the effective discount 
rate, which makes intuitive sense. 
3.3 Decision process of employed job seekers 
The employed job seekers hold a job. The value of that job to the worker was denoted W 
above. It depends positively on the wage but holding a job also implies the worker faces 
the risk of losing it at flow probability λ whereas he also has the option to search and find 
a better job.
16 Again we can write down the Bellman equation: 
w U W s w rW
e
i
e µ ψ λ + − − − = ) ( ) 1 ( 2             (15) 
where it is assumed that the gain from switching jobs is to obtain a mark-up over the 
current wage, w of µ and the flow costs of search are set equal to s
e
2w, so proportional to 
                                                            
16 Here we slightly deviate from Burgess (1993). Burgess assumes all workers to be identical except for 
their wage. Since workers start looking for an alternative job whenever the value of search (which is among 
others positive in tightness) exceeds their reservation wage, not all employees start looking at the same 
time, though their number is positive in tightness. In our model all employees start earning the same wage. 
The incentive to start on-the-job search comes from the mark-up, µ. This mark-up is equal to all employees, 
hence all employees take the same decision regarding search. Increasing tightness raises the probability to 
find  a  job,  which  makes  search  more  profitable.  Though,  the  number  of  employed  job  seekers  is 
independent of tightness, their search effort is, implying that the effective number of employed job seekers 
is positive in tightness, leading to the same effects as Burgess finds.   12 
effort and current wages. Solving (15) for W and setting s
e
i2 to maximise the value of a 
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e                     (16) 
Again the assumption of identical employed job seekers and the properties of ψ
e allow us 
to derive the result that employed job seeker search effort is positive in the mark-up as 
the second order partial derivative with respect to search effort is negative. In addition the 
marginal probability on the left hand side is negative in search effort of the unemployed 
in  channel  2  and  in  unemployment  in  general.  It  is  positive  in  the  vacancy  rate  for 
channel 2 and, through the matching probability in channel 2, also positive in aggregate 
firm search efforts in that channel. Hence the optimal search effort of employed workers 
will increase in tighter labour markets. Note also that the actual wage level has no role to 
play in the search effort for employed workers. This is the result of our assumption that 
both search costs and benefits are proportional to the current wage level. 
Still, as the wage level does determine the value of a job and thereby the aggregate search 
effort of unemployed job seekers, the model is only closed when wages are determined. 
Assuming employers and employees bargain over the wage to divide the surplus of a job, 
standard bargaining theory predicts that the wage will maximise: 
( ) ( )
β β − − − =
1 )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( max arg * w J V w J w W U w W w
w         (17) 
where β represents the bargaining power of the employees. By the fact that free entry 
ensures that the value of a vacancy equals 0, the Nash-maximand above can be simplified 
and using (15), (12) and (10) and a simple price setting rule p=w/α, where prices are a 
mark-up over labour costs, we obtain: 








*                   (18) 
Where it can be verified that equilibrium wages are positive in the fall-back option for the 
unemployed, z, the bargaining power of the employers, 1-β, and the average on-the-job 
effort  in  searching  for  jobs  in  channel  2, s
e
2 and negative  in  the mark-up  on-the-job 
seekers can obtain, µ, and the flow probability of obtaining that mark-up, ψ
e. Only the 
second  partial  derivative  is  troubling  as  higher  wages  compensate  for  higher  search 
intensity and substitute for higher mark-up and transition probability, but the positive 
dependence on employer bargaining power is a result of assuming market power and 
price setting. The price setting rule implies the surplus to the employer is proportional to 
the wage. The downward wage-pressure in this model is exerted by the unemployed who 
increase search intensity and therefore (more than) offset the increase in the value of jobs 
as wages increase. 
Having  shown  the  model  has  an  equilibrium  solution  we  can  now  summarise  its 
properties in three testable predictions or hypotheses regarding recruitment and search 
behaviour. 
Hypothesis I:  In tight labour markets on-the-job search increases, improving the quality 
and quantity of applicants per vacancy in channel 2, advertising.   13 
Hypothesis II: In tight labour markets employers switch to advertising to attract more and 
qualitatively higher applicants. 
Hypothesis III: In tight labour markets unemployed job seekers face tougher competition 
in the open channel. Only the high skilled and recently unemployed will continue to 
search  in  the  open  channel,  the  long-term  low  skilled  unemployed  withdraw  to  the 
exclusive channel, even though their chances of finding a job there may decline. 
4 Testing the model 
To test the predictions of the model we use information from labour demand and supply 
panel  surveys  for  the  Netherlands,  collected  bi-annually  by  the  Institute  of  Labour 
Studies (OSA). We employ the 1986 to 2006 labour supply panels and the 1991 and 2005 
labour demand panels. 
The OSA labour panels contain labour related themes among samples of households and 
firms in the Netherlands. The panels cover a broad range of work and life course related, 
and business environment related items. The labour demand panel is fielded in rotation to 
the labour supply panel. The latter is comparable to the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), though the Dutch panel survey 
is smaller in terms of sample size. The relatively small sample size (and consequently the 
small number of unemployed in the data set) and high separation rates of respondents 
(both  in  the  supply  and  demand  panels)  constrain  us  in  exploiting  the  panel 
characteristics of the data to the full extent, which we will explain below. 
4.1 Tightness and On-the-Job Search  
The validity of our first hypothesis is crucial to our model since it will initiate the chain 
of results that we expect. That is, if on-the-job search is pro-cyclical, the quality of job 
seekers in the ads channel and subsequently the attractiveness of that recruitment channel 
to employers increases when the labour market tightens. 
We  use  eleven  panels  to  test  Hypothesis  I.  However,  we  opt  not  to  conduct  a  fully 
fledged panel analysis, since the labour supply panels are not rich enough to allow such 
analyses for unemployed job seekers (Hypothesis III). Studying employed job search in a 
panel context is possible using the OSA labour supply panels, but to preserve consistency 
in our analysis we refrain from doing it. Instead we pool the eleven labour supply panels, 
which  implies  we  have  to  control  for  dependence  between  dependent  variables 
(respondents  potentially  enter  our  pooled  data  set  eleven  times)  which  will  bias  the 
standard errors. To this end we apply cluster technique (cluster in respondent number), 
which allows observations which are dependent within a cluster (although they must be 
independent between clusters), which ensures robust standard errors. 
Given  the  binary  nature  of  on-the-job  search  (OJS),  we  employ  a  clustered  logit 
regression, which is specified as follows. 
it it t it υ βθ α OJS + + + = γX ] 1 , 0 [               (19) 
Equation 19 contains a tightness variable, θt, and a vector of control variables, Xit. To 
proxy labour market tightness, we use the vacancy rate (vacancy to employment ratio) for 
the years 1986 through to 2006. Labour market tightness fluctuated substantially in this   14 
time frame. Vector Xit consists of the educational level of employees, job security, sector 
of  employment,  and  a  spatial  variable.  The  latter  variable  is  included  to  detect  any 
regional differences in job search behaviour. We expect job security to relate negatively 
to on-the-job search, because a secure job reduces the immediacy to search for alternative 
employment. 
Table 1 provides the results. The results confirm our expectations. An increase in the 
vacancy rate increases on-the-job search. We find that employees with a permanent job 
search significantly less than employees on a fixed term contract regardless whether there 
is a view to a permanent contract. Moreover, on-the-job search is positively related to 
educational levels. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
This evidence supports hypothesis 1 and confirms earlier results in the empirical 
literature. 
4.2 Employer Recruitment Behaviour and Tightness 
Having shown that on-the-job search takes place in tight conditions and bearing in mind 
that on-the-job search takes place through the ads channel, we expect employers to switch 
to the ads channel in an attempt to fill their vacancies when the labour market tightens. 
This is the core of our second hypothesis. 
To test Hypothesis II, we turn to the OSA labour demand panels. Each panel contains 
information about labour market conditions in the period between two panels. We will 
use information on the intensity at which various recruitment channels have been used by 
employers. We are interested in the intensity at which firms use the ads channel (both in 
newspaper and online). The intensity is measured on a four point Licker scale (make: 
never / sometimes / often / always use of the ads channel for recruiting purposes). We 
link this information to labour market conditions the firm faces. We construct two proxies 
for labour market tightness: the ‘vacancy – employment ratio’ and the ‘difficult to fill 
vacancies – employment ratio’. Since we have firm level data, these tightness proxies are 
firm / sector specific. We expect both tightness proxies to correlate positively with the 
firm’s recruitment intensity in the ads channel. Furthermore we include several control 
variables,  notably  categorical  variables  measuring  the  share  of  the  workforce  whose 
highest obtained degree is ‘lower general secondary education’ (MAVO) or lower, firm 
size and sector. 
Since the dependent variable is an ordinal construct we need to apply ordinal logistical 
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where, Open*i is an unobserved continuous variable representing the intensity at which 
firm i uses the open (i.e. ads) channel to recruit personnel; Openi is the observed ordered 
estimate of Open, which we retrieve from the data set; θt measures tightness; Xi is a 
vector of control variables and µi are threshold parameters. 
The results of the two regressions are summarised in Table 2.
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Table 2 about here 
 
We observe that a tight labour market (for both tightness specifications) induces firms to 
intensify recruitment activities in the open channel, which we interpret as evidence that 
the chain reaction, which on-the-job seekers initiated by starting searching for a job in the 
ads  channel  in  tight  labour  market  conditions,  is  followed  up  on  by  employers  who 
intensify their search through the ads channel in tight conditions. 
The  control  variables  show  that  large  firms  and  firms  employing  high  educated 
employees search more intensively through the ads channel. 
However, the results in Table 2 do not provide conclusive evidence that employers switch 
away from the public channel in tight labour market conditions. Therefore we explore the 
relationship  between  the  preferred  recruitment  channel  of  employers  (public  channel 
versus ads channel) and labour market tightness. We use the same independent variables 
as in equation 20. Table 3 presents the results of this logit specification. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
We find a statistically significant negative link between the employer’s preference of the 
public  channel  for  recruitment  purposes  and  tightness  on  the  labour  market.  That  is, 
employers indeed switch away from the public channel in favour of the open channel in 
tightening labour market conditions, which confirms our second hypothesis. 
                                                            
17 We decide to present coefficients in Table 2, though this is technically not correct. The coefficients in an 
ordinal regression are hard to interpret – see Green (2002). To be correct, marginal effects should be 
presented. However, since we have four ordinal categories and two regressions in Table 2 (and Table 3), 
presenting marginal effects would lead to 10 columns. To keep the table(s) legible, we do not present 
marginal effects but instead present coefficients. We did run marginal effects. The interpretation of the 
coefficients does not differ from those findings.   16 
4.3 The Unemployed Job Seeker’s Dilemma 
Now that Hypotheses I and II are confirmed, we know that unemployed job seekers face 
a  dilemma  in  tight  conditions:  continue  searching  in  the  public  channel  where 
competition is low, like the rate of posted vacancies, or alternatively, switch to the open 
channel where competition is fierce, though the posted vacancy rate is high. 
In testing Hypothesis III we return to the labour supply survey. OSA only collects data on 
search channels for unemployed job seekers. This implies that we basically face a two 
stage problem. The probabilities of using one channel or another are conditional on the 
probability  of  being  unemployed.  Still,  as  Hypothesis  III  is  formulated  also  in  these 
conditional terms, we can test it in a single stage estimation framework. We distinguish 
three types of search channels: two formal channels (ads and the labour exchange office) 
and one rest category within the informal channels (including open applications, network 
of friends, and temp agencies). We focus on the unemployed job seeker’s use of the two 
formal channels. 
Hypothesis III stipulates that only the most confident unemployed job seekers (arguably, 
the  short-term  unemployed  and  highly  educated  among  the  unemployed)  will  switch 
towards the ads channel once firms make that switch in tight labour market conditions. 
To test this hypothesis we use the unemployed’s preferred search channel (ads versus 
labour exchange office) as a dependent variable. Equation 21 gives the logit specification. 
it it t it υ βθ α Open + + + = γX ] 1 , 0 [               (21) 
Where θt is the tightness indicator, which is the aggregate vacancy rate that varies only 
over time (vacancies to employment ratio). Table 4 presents the results of this regression. 
We  have  two  different  specification.  In  the  left  column  vector  Xit  includes  dummy 
variables for long-term unemployment (an uncompleted spell of unemployment of one 
year  is  the  threshold),  for  place  of  birth  and  a  categorical  variable  indicating  the 
unemployed’s confidence to find a job. In the right column vector Xit includes dummy 
variables  for  long-term  unemployment,  for  place  of  birth  and  a  categorical  variable 
indicating educational attainments. As in Table 1, we have pooled the data and clustered 
on respondent number to obtain robust standard errors. 
First we note that labour market tightness does not induce the unemployed to switch 
search channel. That is, unemployed job seekers persevere in their job search channel 
choice. Given the line of our argument so far that is particularly problematic for those 
who decide to use the labour exchange office as their preferred job search channel, as the 
vacancy  arrival  rate  through  that  channel  decreases  in  an  economic  upturn.  Table  4 
reveals  that  these  unemployed  are  the  ones  who  either  have  very  low  confidence  in 
finding  a  new  job  or  who  have  very  low  educational  attainments,  i.e.  the  most 
disadvantaged unemployed job seekers. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Summarizing the analysis of the data we conclude that on-the-job search indeed increases 
in tighter labour markets and therefore firms do switch to the open recruitment channels   17 
leaving  the  unemployed  seekers  the  choice  between  the  ineffective  labour  exchange 
office  and tough competition in open channels.  We  find that the  most disadvantaged 
unemployed  job  seekers  are  more  likely  to  use  the  labour  exchange  office  as  their 
preferred  recruitment  channel  and  they  do  not  switch  away  from  it  in  tightening 
conditions. This implies that they trap themselves in unemployment in times when the 
economy  recovers  and  ideally  they  should  be  finding  employment  through  the  open 
recruitment channels that employers are searching in. 
5 Policy implications 
The enrichment of the Burgess (1993) analysis – by including recruitment channel choice 
–  also  provides  insights  into  the  effectiveness  of  the  labour  exchange  office  as  an 
instrument  in  labour  market  policy.  Labour  market  conditions  influence  on-the-job 
search, which subsequently influences the firm’s recruitment channel choice. That is, in 
tight conditions firms switch away from the labour exchange office, making job search 
through that channel relatively ineffective. 
The relative ineffectiveness of the labour exchange office as a channel through which the 
unemployed find a job in tight conditions provides an explanation for structural mismatch 
on  the  labour  market.  That  is,  if  the  unemployed  persist  in  searching  via  the  labour 
exchange  office  in  prosperous  times,  the  structural  co-existence  of  vacancies  and 
unemployment  can  be  explained,  as  firms  post  vacancies  through  the  advertisement 
channel and the unemployed look for jobs through the labour exchange office. 
Our analysis leads to some interesting repercussions for the use of the labour exchange 
office as an instrument in labour market policy. In slack conditions the labour exchange 
office is relatively productive in matching vacancies to job seekers. In such conditions the 
labour exchange office should not concentrate on administrative tasks measuring how 
many unemployed have registered, but on matching. In tight conditions, labour exchange 
offices should persuade unemployed job seekers to search through alternative channels 
like  advertisements.  Or  alternatively,  if  the  government  decides  to  implement  active 
labour market policies like wage subsidy schemes, our analysis unorthodoxly suggests 
that such schemes should be procyclical. Moreover procyclical implementation of wage 
subsidy schemes has the additional advantage that it leads to less subsidy wastage as 
Welters  and  Muysken  (2006)  point  out,  which  makes  this  policy  instrument  more 
effective. 
6 Concluding remarks 
In tightening labour market conditions both the number and the search effort of employed 
job seekers increases. Since employed job seekers search for jobs through advertisements 
and not through the labour exchange office, this raises the probability to fill a vacancy 
through the former channel relative to using the latter. Subsequently in tight conditions 
firms shift recruitment channel towards advertisements. Not to keep up the arrival rate of 
job seekers in tight conditions – like Russo et al. (2000, 2001) claim – but simply to 
exploit  the  relative  superiority  of  using  advertisements  to  fill  vacancies  in  tight 
conditions.   18 
Unemployed  job  seekers  now  face  a  dilemma.  Also  switch  search  channel  towards 
advertisements, where competition is strong. Or remain searching for jobs through the 
labour exchange office where competition is less strong, but where job offers are few and 
far  apart.  The  second  option  is  novel  to  the  existing  analysis  introduced  by  Burgess 
(1993) and reinforces his results: unemployed job seekers only partly benefit from tight 
labour market conditions. 
Our findings yield some unorthodox policy implications. The effectiveness of guiding the 
(long-term)  unemployed  to  employment  via  the  labour  exchange  office  depends  on 
labour market conditions. In slack conditions job search via the labour exchange office is 
more  effective  than  in  tight  conditions,  as  a  consequence  of  the  firm’s  recruitment 
strategies. If the labour exchange office is an important instrument in a government’s 
labour market policy it should be used when it is most effective: in slack conditions. 
Perhaps  counter-intuitively,  additional  labour  market  policies  should  be  implemented 
pro-cyclically, to help long-term unemployed compete in the more open channels when 
labour markets tighten. 
Of course our findings are limited in many ways and a lot of research need to be done. 
We would like to see our hypotheses confirmed in other datasets for different countries 
and  different  time  periods  to  check  the  robustness  and  generality  of  our  findings. 
Furthermore, as there are several competing explanations for Burgess’ (1993) findings, 
we would like to generalize the model to include these alternatives and identify how they 
can be distinguished empirically. We set that ambitious agenda for future research in the 
hope that others may join it. 
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